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EVERYONE’S A LITTLE BIT RACIST?
RECONCILING IMPLICIT BIAS AND TITLE VII
Christopher Cerullo*
Since its enactment as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII’s
main purpose has been to end all forms of employment discrimination.
Through a flexible judicial interpretation of Title VII that reached newly
discovered forms of discrimination, and through occasional intervention by
Congress to update the statute, Title VII has been largely successful in
reducing and remedying instances of overt discrimination in the workplace.
However, more recently, social scientists have analyzed and applied the
results of Harvard’s Implicit Association Test to recognize a new form of
discrimination characterized by a subconscious decisionmaking process
based on intuition and a lack of an overt intent to discriminate. This
phenomenon is called “implicit bias.”
To date, several courts have been receptive to incorporating an implicit
bias-based theory of employment discrimination, seeing this as the next step
in the battle to end all forms of discrimination. Yet many other courts have
remained skeptical of the impact of implicit bias and have refused to find
that discrimination existed without a showing of intent, specific actions by
an employer, or specific employment practices. This Note examines the
struggle courts face when analyzing potential instances of implicit bias, and
suggests how implicit bias–based claims can be consistent with the existing
Title VII intent-based framework and evaluated with minimal changes to
that framework.
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]here are . . . things which a man is afraid to tell even to himself, and
every decent man has a number of such things stored away in his mind.”1

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 was enacted with the broad
purpose of ending all forms of discrimination within the workplace.3 Over
the course of almost sixty years, Title VII has effectively reduced and
limited instances of overt and invidious employment discrimination through
a flexible interpretation by the courts and a willingness to amend Title VII
when new employment discrimination scenarios arise.4 When overt
discrimination was the leading form of discrimination for which employees
sought a remedy, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the McDonnell Douglas
Corp. burden-shifting framework to give employees a full and fair chance
to raise and vet any appropriate employment discrimination claims.5 When
seemingly neutral business practices had the unintended effect of

1. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND 39 (Richard Pevear & Larissa
Volokhosky trans., Vintage Books 1993) (1864).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
3. See Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 488 (2005).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.A.1.
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discriminating against protected classes of employees, the Supreme Court
(and later, Congress) developed the disparate impact framework to allow
employees to challenge these practices without having to prove intent.6
Eventually, it became apparent that employers could escape liability when a
discriminatory intent accompanied a legitimate business purpose, so both
the Supreme Court and Congress sought to update Title VII’s application by
including a mixed-motive framework to allow employees to challenge these
mixed intentions as at least partially discriminatory practices.7 As such,
both the judiciary and Congress should be commended for the advancement
of women and minorities in the workplace.
Despite this, recent social science studies, led by various analyses of the
Implicit Associations Test (IAT),8 have found that a somewhat newly
discovered form of discrimination called “implicit bias”9 still pervades the
workplace environment, often remaining completely unnoticed.10 Implicit
biases in the workplace may take the form of a “gut feeling” in situations
where two candidates are equally qualified for a position. Depending on
each candidate’s race, religion, gender, or other identifying characteristics,
their qualifications may be weighted differently.11 When this phenomenon
occurs, the decisionmaker is entirely unaware and rarely questions the
legitimacy of this choice. Through data collected from the IAT, researchers
have discovered that these implicit biases are pervasive throughout our
society and may play a large role in modern Title VII employment
discrimination.12 Until implicit bias becomes more commonly recognized,
little can be done to combat this new frontier in discrimination.

6. See infra Part I.A.2.
7. See infra Part I.A.3.
8. For an online version of the test, see PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://implicit.harvard.edu/
implicit/research (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). The IAT is a sorting task that measures time
differences in pairings of images (an African American male and a Caucasian male) and
words (positive and negative). See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:
A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2006).
IAT takers must press one button for representation of “African American” and “negative”
and another button for representation of “Caucasian” and “positive” and vice versa. See
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 971
(2006). Generally, IAT takers react faster when the Caucasian, rather than the African
American, image is paired with the positive word. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 948–50
(2006).
9. This Note uses the terms “implicit bias” and “unconscious bias” interchangeably to
reduce confusion, since the courts evaluating this type of discrimination have done the same.
10. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 487 (2010); see also infra Part I.B.
11. See infra Part I.B. For example, if a male decisionmaker that holds an implicit bias
against women is evaluating two equally qualified candidates, one male and one female, for
a job that requires the employee to travel across the country often, that decisionmaker will
select the male based on the gut feeling that he is more qualified. However, the truth behind
that gut feeling may be that the decisionmaker improperly assumes a woman would prefer to
stay home tending to her husband and children, rather than travel extensively, regardless of
the woman’s desire to work. This hypothetical is based on the facts of Lust v. Sealy, Inc.,
277 F. Supp. 2d 973 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
12. See infra Part I.B.
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However, state and federal courts have struggled to find the most
effective way to evaluate whether an employer has unconsciously
discriminated against an employee or job candidate, or whether the choice
was merely based on some other legitimate factor.13 Many of these courts
fall into one of two camps. In the first, judges are skeptical of implicit bias
evidence and hesitate to find an employer liable for unintentional and
unknown actions.14 These courts tend to reject implicit bias–based claims
of employment discrimination, and instead favor any of the myriad
alternatives for the outcome of an employment decision, such as business
needs or subjective discretion.15 In the other camp, judges are more
accepting of the implicit bias evidence and recognize the need to provide a
remedy to employees or job candidates alleging these types of claims.16
These courts are more amenable to the various employment discrimination
claims, seeking either to evaluate them under the existing Title VII
framework or a slightly modified Title VII framework.17 Nevertheless,
without greater acceptance by either the courts or Congress, employees
raising claims of implicit bias–based discrimination remain largely without
a remedy.
Part I of this Note explains the background against which Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted and the three major legal
frameworks—disparate treatment, disparate impact, and mixed-motive
discrimination—that courts developed and now use to evaluate potential
violations of Title VII. It also provides a description of implicit bias and its
effects on workplace decisionmaking, and then explores the pros and cons
of recognizing implicit bias as a type of discrimination contemplated by
Title VII’s existing framework. Part II analyzes how courts address
allegations of implicit bias–based discrimination. Finally, Part III argues
that courts must definitively incorporate implicit bias into the Title VII
analysis and describes how this new analysis is both consistent with and
supported by the current purpose, language, and framework that courts
already use to evaluate employment discrimination claims under Title VII.
I. TITLE VII’S NEWEST CHALLENGE: IMPLICIT BIAS
Since its enactment, the judiciary has taken an active role in interpreting
Title VII to address various issues in employment discrimination cases as
they arise. Although the Supreme Court may not accept a new and original
claim of employment discrimination immediately, the Court remains a
strong driving force behind the interpretation of Title VII. In turn,
Congress has amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to recognize the
Court’s decisions.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.

2013]

EVERYONE’S A LITTLE BIT RACIST?

131

This Part first describes the history of Title VII’s enactment, as well as
the developments that led to the Supreme Court’s various modifications to,
and interpretations of, the statute, including the disparate treatment,
disparate impact, and mixed-motive discrimination frameworks. It then
explores the cognitive science discovery of implicit bias through the use of
the IAT and the possible consequences of implicit bias in the workplace.
Finally, this Part concludes by noting several arguments for and against
recognizing implicit bias as a part of Title VII.
A. A Brief History of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The first federal governmental action against employment discrimination
was an executive order signed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in
1941.18 No further action was taken for nearly a decade. Then, in the
1950s, state legislatures interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision
desegregating public schools in Brown v. Board of Education19 to mandate
equal employment opportunity as well.20
After a lengthy debate amongst the federal legislative and executive
branches, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. 21 Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from making employment-related
decisions, either directly or implicitly, on the basis of race, religion, or sex,
among other protected classifications.22 Ultimately, Title VII’s overriding
goal was to provide equal employment opportunities for all United States
citizens by creating a broad set of protections against all forms of
discrimination, both overt and subtle.23 Despite its goal of reducing
employment discrimination, the word “discrimination” remains statutorily

18. PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL 13 (1985).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), had
unconstitutionally permitted racially separate but equal facilities to continue existing).
20. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY
IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 4 (2d ed. 2007). By the 1950s, many states had begun enacting
fair employment practice laws, which would become a model for Title VII. Id. These early
state laws, however, were ineffectively enforced. Id.
21. For a brief history of the development of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from 1957 to
1964, see THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: BACKGROUND, STATUTES & PRIMER 12 (Irene Y. Capozzi
ed., 2006).
22. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
Section 2000e-2(a) currently reads, in relevant part,
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or . . . in any way which would . . . otherwise adversely affect [that
individual’s] status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
23. See Damon Ritenhouse, A Primer on Title VII: Part One, ABA GPSOLO (Jan. 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2013/january_2013/primer_title_vi
i_part_one.html (“[T]he central focus of Title VII became to dismantle tangible barriers that
operate to disadvantage minority employees.”).

132

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

undefined to this day.24 This is partially because, by the 1940s, a general
list of prohibited employment practices already existed.25 Additionally, the
meaning of “discrimination” was later interpreted through early activist
Supreme Court decisions.26 But once the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
enacted, Congress generally refrained from addressing employment
discrimination, except for major amendments to Title VII in 1972 and 1991
as a result of the aforementioned Supreme Court rulings.27
As in the past, today’s Congress is unlikely to change the structural
framework of Title VII without high levels of public support28 or strong
judicial leadership to inspire updated legislation.29 As a consequence of
congressional gridlock,30 the judiciary has become the de facto developer of
Title VII.31 Through both its previous incarnations and in its current form,
the language of Title VII has spawned many legal theories under which
employees and job candidates can bring discrimination claims. Moreover,
courts still possess the ability to reinterpret Title VII when changed
employment practices demand it.
1. Disparate Treatment
The disparate treatment claim is the epitome of modern Title VII
employment discrimination claims. Disparate treatment occurs when an
employer takes a specific action to treat an employee differently from
others because of the employer’s discriminatory motive.32 The current

24. See, e.g., RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 11; Patrick S. Shin, Liability for
Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in the Theory of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 80 (2010). Title VII was largely premised on the
notion that courts or judges would recognize discriminatory practices when they arose. See
RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 18–19.
25. BURSTEIN, supra note 18, at 25. Senator Hubert Humphrey, broadly defending the
bill, stated, “[Title VII] does not limit the employer’s freedom to hire, fire, promote or
demote for any reasons . . . so long as his action is not based on race.” 110 CONG. REC. 5423
(1964).
26. See infra Part I.A.1–3; see also RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 11.
27. See, e.g., BURSTEIN, supra note 18, at 35 (stating that Title VII was amended in 1972
to provide the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with enforcement
powers); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was
amended to incorporate Supreme Court decisions regarding types of intentional
discrimination). Two theories offered for the lack of congressional action on Title VII are
(1) that Congress believes that Title VII has effectively eliminated employment
discrimination, and (2) that Congress is merely giving the law a chance to work before
taking further action. BURSTEIN, supra note 18, at 35–36. However, given that Title VII was
last amended over twenty years ago, some scholars question how well the statute has held up
over time in actuality. See, e.g., Ritenhouse, supra note 23.
28. See BURSTEIN, supra note 18, at 62, 67.
29. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 13.
30. See, e.g., David Lawder, Democrats Hold Senate, Moderates Fade in Both Parties,
REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usacampaign-senateidUSBRE8A60HE20121107?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc
=69.
31. See Ritenhouse, supra note 23.
32. See 1 CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS § 1:29 (2012); 1 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
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framework for evaluating a disparate treatment case was laid out by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,33 which created a
three-step burden-shifting framework that was later refined in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.34
McDonnell Douglas Corp. involved Mr. Green, an African American
mechanic and laboratory technician, who participated in organized protests
against his employer’s allegedly racially motivated hiring practices after
being laid off.35 After unsuccessfully reapplying at McDonnell Douglas,
Green filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), claiming that racial discrimination was the true
motive behind McDonnell Douglas’s refusal to rehire him.36 McDonnell
Douglas responded that Green was not rehired because of his involvement
in the protests.37
Because the district court did not give Green an opportunity to respond to
his employer’s reason for refusing to rehire him, the Eighth Circuit
reversed, stating that employees should receive the opportunity to
demonstrate that employers’ reasoning is simply a pretext.38 In affirming
the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court set forth the modern burden-shifting
framework, seeking to balance both the societal and individual interests of
employers and employees alike.39
The first step in the Court’s burden-shifting framework requires the
employee to establish a prima facie case of Title VII employment
discrimination40 by a preponderance of the evidence.41 This burden is “not
onerous.”42 By raising a prima facie case, the employees create an
inference that their employers discriminated against them.43 Once the
employee establishes the prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:2 (2009). The Supreme Court has referred to this standard as “the
most easily understood type of discrimination.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977)).
33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
34. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
35. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 794.
36. Id. at 796.
37. Id. at 797.
38. Id. at 797–98.
39. Id. at 801–02 (“The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and
consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral
employment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it is
abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”).
40. Id. at 802. Employees can make a prima facie case by alleging that they: (1) belong
to a class of persons protected by Title VII; (2) applied to and were qualified for an open job;
(3) were qualified for the job and rejected; and (4) can state that the job remained open after
their rejection and that the employer sought other employees with similar qualifications. Id.
41. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54 (1981).
42. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (quoting Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253). But see Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (noting how difficult it is for employees
to state a cause of action under the disparate treatment framework).
43. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253–54 (“The prima facie case serves an important function in
the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the
[employee’s] rejection.”).
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employer, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision not to hire the employee.44 To meet this burden, the employer
must merely present evidence that creates an issue of material fact
regarding the reason for its employment decision.45 The ultimate goal of
this step is to match the employee’s prima facie case of discrimination by
creating a sufficiently clear and reasonably specific factual issue that the
employee can fairly challenge as pretextual.46 Finally, the burden returns to
the employee to demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reason given by the
employer is simply a pretext for discrimination.47 Throughout this burdenshifting scheme, the ultimate question should always be whether the
employee was intentionally discriminated against.48 Although the burden
“shifts” between employee and employer, the ultimate burden of proving
intentional discrimination at trial always remains with the employee.49
Presently, the courts are more willing than in past years to grant summary
judgment disposing of a disparate treatment discrimination claim in favor of
the employer.50
2. Disparate Impact
The first departure from the traditional Title VII employment
discrimination claim came in the form of the disparate impact theory.
While disparate treatment cases typically involve discriminatory actions and
intent, disparate impact cases involve seemingly neutral actions that have a
disproportionate impact on members of a protected class of persons—no
discriminatory motive is required.51 The disparate impact burden-shifting

44. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The Court noted that a wide range of
legitimate reasons, both objective and subjective, exist. See id. at 802–03.
45. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–55. Specifically, the employer only has to explain why the
decision was made or present evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. Id. at
256 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978)).
46. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255–56, 258.
47. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804 (“While Title VII does not, without
more, compel rehiring of [an employee], neither does it permit [the employer] to use [an
employee’s] conduct as a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by [Title VII].”);
see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (“[The employee] may succeed in this either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”).
Relevant evidence at this stage may include the employer’s general treatment of minorities
or whether the employer treated similarly situated employees differently. See, e.g.,
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804–05.
48. See, e.g., ROSSEIN, supra note 32, § 2:9; Lee, supra note 3, at 482 (“[T]he plaintiff
must demonstrate that the employer was motivated by racial or other animus at the precise
moment the adverse employment action was taken . . . .”).
49. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (“The . . . division of intermediate evidentiary burdens
serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question
[of intentional discrimination].”); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 986 (1988) (“[T]hese shifting burdens are meant only to aid courts and litigants in
arranging the presentation of evidence . . . .”).
50. See Lee, supra note 3, at 482.
51. See ROSSEIN, supra note 32, § 2:30.
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framework was first established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,52 and was
formally adopted into Title VII in 1991.53
In Griggs, Duke Power had a longstanding policy of refusing African
American employees access to employment outside of the company’s labor
department until 1955; employees within the labor department received the
lowest wages of all employees.54 In 1955, Duke Power departed from its
policy of outright exclusion by requiring all employees to have a high
school diploma as a prerequisite for employment outside the labor
department.55 Finally, in 1965, responding to the newly enacted Title VII,
Duke Power provided an alternative to the diploma requirement in the form
of a professionally designed high school equivalency exam.56 The African
American employees brought a class action lawsuit against their employer,
alleging that Duke Power’s policy violated Title VII.57 Although Duke
Power had not engaged in any overt acts of intentional discrimination,58 the
Supreme Court created a new framework to provide Duke Power’s African
American employees with a remedy.
Congress intended Title VII to reach the discriminatory effects of
employment practices, not just the motivations behind them.59 Under
Griggs’s disparate impact framework, employees must first demonstrate
that a seemingly neutral business practice exists that has the effect of
discriminating against a protected group.60 Neutral business practices
include a broad range of objective activities, such as intelligence tests.61 In
line with the holding in Griggs, employees may now challenge subjective
practices and mixed objective-subjective practices as well.62 The employer
can rebut the employee’s showing of discriminatory impact by
demonstrating that the practice exists as a matter of business necessity or
relevance to job performance.63 Finally, the employee can reject the
52. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (stating that a disparate impact claim is
established when “a complaining party demonstrates that [an employer] uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of [a protected
characteristic] and the [employer] fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”); ROSSEIN supra
note 32, § 2:30.
54. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426–27.
55. Id. at 427.
56. Id. at 427–28.
57. Id. at 426.
58. See id. at 428. The Fourth Circuit had held that, without evidence of intent, Duke
Power could not have violated Title VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225,
1232 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
59. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
60. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (discussing
the employee’s need to identify an employment practice and prove it had a discriminatory
impact); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”).
61. See ROSSEIN supra note 32, § 2:30.
62. See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 989–90. However, in cases of mixed objectivesubjective practices, the court will evaluate them as if they were purely subjective practices.
Id. at 994.
63. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 997–98; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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employer’s rebuttal by demonstrating that a less discriminatory alternative
practice exists, but the employer still refuses to utilize it.64 The relevant
inquiry almost always takes place on a job-specific level.65
Years later, the Supreme Court considered the role of statistics and the
appropriate standards by which courts may evaluate statistical data in
disparate impact cases.66 The Court recognized that, despite the utilities of
statistical proof, some danger still existed when proving a disparate impact
claim.67 As such, the Court recognized that a higher standard of proof
would be required when evaluating statistical data to protect against any
The Court also
abuses, especially given statistical uncertainties.68
expressed some reluctance in the form of skepticism of the veracity of the
statistical data presented by employees.69
Additionally, in response to the need for a higher standard of proof, Title
VII now provides that the courts may evaluate a claim based on whether an
employee can point to a specific business practice—unless that practice
cannot be separated into individual components.70
Given the higher standard of proof, fewer cases of this type are currently
being filed in state and federal courts.71
3. Mixed-Motive Discrimination
Like disparate impact cases, mixed-motive cases were not recognized as
part of Title VII until after the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of
1964.72 This recognition resulted, in part, from the Supreme Court’s own
development of a mixed-motive framework and its subsequent

64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2006); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). The court must additionally consider the costs and other
burdens of that alternative practice when evaluating the strength of the employee’s claim.
See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
65. See Pippen v. Iowa, No. LACL10738, slip op. at 8 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012),
appeal filed, No. 12-0913 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2012).
66. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994–97.
67. Id. at 992. The Court recognized that statistical proof could potentially have an
unintended chilling effect on legitimate business practices. See id. at 993.
68. See id. at 992 (“It is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimination is
the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in accord with the laws of
chance. It would be equally unrealistic to suppose that employers can eliminate, or discover
and explain, the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the
composition of their workforces.” (citations omitted)). However, the Court also refused to
delineate a specific “mathematical formula” for determining when statistical proof satisfied
the employee’s burden. Id. at 994–95 (“[S]tatistical disparities must be sufficiently
substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.”).
69. See id. at 996–97 (stating that courts are not forced to accept employees’ statistical
evidence and that employers are free to present their own countervailing evidence).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (“[T]he complaining party shall
demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact,
except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the
decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.”).
71. See Lee, supra note 3, at 482.
72. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).
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interpretation of these amendments. The evolution of Title VII employment
discrimination claims dealing with mixed motives started with the Court’s
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins73 and continued through Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa.74 In a mixed-motive case, as the name would
suggest, the employee alleges that the employer’s decision was based on
both legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, as well as illegitimate,
discriminatory reasons, but that the illegitimate reasons actually drove the
decision.75 In mixed-motive cases, the ultimate inquiry is whether a
protected classification was a factor in an employer’s decision when it was
made.76 The mixed-motive framework seeks to preserve the delicate
balance between an employer’s right to choose how to run its business, and
an employee’s right to work free from the discrimination.77
In Hopkins, a female senior manager at Price Waterhouse brought a Title
VII employment discrimination claim against her employers after being
denied the opportunity to become a partner.78 The firm’s decisionmakers
found her too aggressive and unfriendly, and subsequently told her to soften
her image by behaving more femininely in order to be reconsidered for
partnership.79 Because Price Waterhouse’s decision included a legitimate
motive in addition to sex stereotyping, the Court sought to create a
framework by which employees could demonstrate the existence of
discriminatory behavior.
The employee must first prove that an illegitimate motive led to an
employment decision that negatively affected the employee.80
Additionally, the employee must then show that the employer would not
have made an identical decision even if that illegitimate motive did not
exist.81
To prove a mixed-motive discrimination claim, the employee may
present either direct or circumstantial evidence.82 Appropriate evidence
includes statements by the employer (specifically, the individual who made
the decision) that demonstrate the discriminatory animus and that directly

73. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
74. 539 U.S. at 90.
75. See RICHEY, supra note 32, § 1:42.
76. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 241.
77. See id. at 239.
78. See id. at 231–32.
79. Id. at 235. For a full account of the facts of this case, see infra notes 209–23 and
accompanying text.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2006); see also Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 241–42
(recognizing that Congress rejected the use of the phrase “solely because of” in Title VII and
determining that the court must look at all factors, legitimate and illegitimate, in assessing
liability for employment discrimination); Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 847–48
(9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (interpreting the language of § 2000e-2(m)).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 242 (“[A]n employer shall
not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have
come to the same decision regarding a particular person.”).
82. Costa, 539 U.S. at 100 (“‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may
also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’” (quoting Rogers v.
Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957))).
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relate to the contested decision.83 However, “stray remarks” made by an
employer are insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory animus, as are any
statements susceptible to multiple interpretations any number of which are
either discriminatory or nondiscriminatory.84
Generally, employees face a relatively high burden in proving a case of
mixed-motive discrimination, limiting the utility of this framework to
employees.85
B. What Is Implicit Bias?
Implicit biases are defined as the subconscious attitudes, feelings, and
stereotypes that an individual may possess towards a given social group.86
Such biases are assimilated through interactions with others and an
individual’s culture, and are picked up throughout an individual’s
lifetime.87 Yet, most individuals are entirely unaware that they possess any
implicit biases.88 Notably, tests have found that implicit biases are not
uncorrectable. Individuals respond to (and try to eradicate) their implicit
biases when they are made aware of them, or when they interact with a
nonstereotypical member of the social group against which they hold an
implicit bias.89
This section of the Note explores the main tool that cognitive scientists
use to measure the existence, extent, and impact of implicit biases. This
section further explains the changes that the workplace has seen over the
past fifty years. Finally, this section describes the ways in which employers
make decisions, as well as the opportunities that implicit biases have to
infect the decisionmaking process.
1. The Implicit Association Test
In 1998, three social scientists founded Project Implicit to study the
existence of implicit social thought.90 Project Implicit’s key tool to collect
data on implicit attitudes is the IAT.91 Project Implicit and the IAT rely
entirely on participants who frequent the website and take an IAT, so the

83. RICHEY, supra note 32, § 1:42.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and
Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 149 (2010); Eva Paterson et al., The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building upon Charles Lawrence’s
Vision To Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175,
1186 (2008).
87. Bennett, supra note 86, at 149.
88. See, e.g., id. at 149; Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 1124, 1129 (2012); Paterson et al., supra note 86, at 1188.
89. See Bennett, supra note 86, at 153; Kang & Lane, supra note 10, at 511.
90. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://projectimplicit.net/about.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2013).
91. For a description of the IAT, see supra note 8. Since 1998, Project Implicit’s
website has collected more than three million IATs. Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at 1072.
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sample of individuals who take the IAT may not be as representative of the
general population as if a randomly selected sample were used.92 However,
from these studies, social scientists have found that implicit biases are
extremely common, separate from explicit biases, and that the IAT predicts
behavior in the real world.93
Generally, most takers of the IAT show favoritism for one social group
over another, rather than having no biases at all.94 Further, takers prefer
socially privileged characteristics—typically the preferred subject is the
heterosexual, affluent, Catholic, Caucasian male.95 The IAT demonstrates
that implicit biases predict how an individual will act towards members of
both favored and disfavored groups better than explicit biases.96
Additionally, because implicit biases are unknown to the individual that
possesses them, they tend to come across in other ways that demonstrate
“social warmth.”97
2. The Evolution of Employment Practices:
Decisionmaking and Implicit Bias
There are several factors that influence an employer’s decisionmaking
process. These include the structure of the workplace, the time spent
contemplating the decision, the characteristics considered in the decision,
and the employer’s contact with employees of dissimilar backgrounds.
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the workplace has
shifted to a more “fluid process of social interaction, perception, evaluation,
and disbursement of opportunity.”98 Similarly, employees are working in
jobs that rely on the employees’ ability to adapt to a variety of tasks, rather
than focus on just one well-defined task.99 Employees are also increasingly
required to work in teams.100 In other words, the workplace has shifted
away from the rigid and linear systems of the past, which has enhanced the
impact of implicit biases on the employment decisionmaking process.
Whereas, in the past, many employment decisions were motivated by

92. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 955. However, Greenwald and Krieger
also note that the same findings would appear with a more representative sample, as well. Id.
at 956.
93. Kang et al., supra note 88, at 1130–31.
94. See Kang & Lane, supra note 10, at 474; see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note
8, at 955 (“[O]nly 18% of respondents [could] be judged implicitly neutral.”).
95. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 971; Kang & Lane, supra note 10, at 474.
96. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 954–55 (noting that individuals generally
suppress any explicit biases that they are aware of, so as to not appear racist or sexist).
97. Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at 1073 (“[I]mplicit biases correlate[] with real-world
behaviors like being friendly toward a target . . . and evaluating job candidates . . . .”).
Examples of “social warmth” include: (1) friendliness, (2) eye contact, and (3) spatial
closeness. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 954–55.
98. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Towards a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99–108 (2003).
99. See id. at 101–02.
100. See id.
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explicit biases, these decisions are now more commonly tainted by implicit
biases.101
The decisionmaking process can be divided into two “systems” to
highlight how implicit biases pervade everyday thought.102 In “System I,”
individuals make quick decisions that are largely based on intuition.103
These decisions tend to be more prone to errors in judgment.104 If
individuals remain unaware of their biases, they will not try to correct
System I decisions.105 On the other hand, decisions made in “System II”
tend to be more thought-out and based on deliberation, resulting in more
accurate decisions.106 Thus, when individuals have to explain their
decisionmaking processes, they tend to be less biased.107 The modern, fluid
structure of the workplace lends itself to an increasing number of System I
decisions. 108
Employers also commonly rely on subjective characteristics to evaluate
their employees. In fact, employers often find subjective characteristics to
be indispensable to the decisionmaking process and necessary to smooth the
functioning of the workplace.109 However, implicit biases often invade
these subjective decisions in a phenomenon referred to as “malleability of
merit.”110 Through this sliding-scale process, employers will alter how
much weight they attribute to any given qualification based on a gut feeling
as to which candidate they believe can do the better job.111 This is
especially true where either of two candidates is equally qualified.112
The “social contact hypothesis” acts as a counterweight to this trend
toward increased implicit bias–based decisions. This hypothesis argues that
close interactions with members of an “outgroup” against whom an
individual may harbor an implicit bias may help to create a more positive

101. Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the
Relational Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1435 (2008).
102. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 975–76.
103. Id. For example, if an evaluator expects an African American individual to be
violent, the evaluator will see evidence of violent behavior when presented with ambiguous
behavior. See, e.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at 1085.
104. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 974.
105. Id. at 976.
106. Id. at 975.
107. E.g., Kang et al., supra note 88, at 1178; Lee, supra note 3, at 486.
108. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 974–75 (discussing the use of “attribute
substitution” to answer hard questions by asking easier ones).
109. See Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 470 (2003) (“[D]iscretionary acts are useful and necessary to
any employer.”).
110. See Kang et al., supra note 88, at 1156–58; see also Green, supra note 98, at 98–99
(“The decisionmaker . . . may be entirely unaware of the influence of his stereotypes on his
ultimate decision.”); Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at 1086 (“[I]mplicit bias as measured by
the IAT has been correlated with biased evaluations of job candidates.”).
111. See Kang et al., supra note 88, at 1156–57. For an example of malleability of merit,
see supra note 11.
112. See id.; Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Racism Without Racists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2008, at WK.10.
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feeling towards that group as a whole.113 Taking this a step further, a
workplace environment where individuals of various ingroups must rely on
individuals from outgroups could help to reduce implicit biases by creating
a stronger, more accurate understanding of each other, as opposed to a real
or perceived disconnect between supervisors and their employees.114
3. Studies on the Effects of Race and Gender on Hiring Decisions
Several studies have been conducted to discover and analyze the impact
of unconscious attitudes and stereotypes on hiring decisions. The subjects
of these studies range from the effects of implicit biases on reviewing
resumes to the impacts of anonymous hiring upon increased minority
representation in the workplace.
One such study examined how a particular name listed on a resume can
affect an applicant’s chances of receiving an interview.115 By varying the
quality of resumes used, as well as the names on each resume,116 the study
found that—regardless of the quality of the application—an applicant with
a “white” name will receive about one interview for every ten applications,
while an applicant with a “black” name will receive one interview for every
fifteen applications.117
Interestingly, social scientists have also found that, despite the need for a
subjective decision, implicit biases can be controlled through anonymous
hiring. Specifically, the blind audition system has worked wonders for
equal employment opportunities within the major symphony orchestras in
the United States, helping more females to get hired.118 Claudia Goldin and
Cecelia Rouse’s study found that, by using blind auditions, the chances a
woman had to advance to the final round of auditions or to secure a position
within the orchestra increased by 25 percent.119

113. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 964; Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at
1101–05.
114. See Green, supra note 98, at 147.
115. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 991 (2004).
116. The study utilized distinctive Caucasian names (like Brad and Allison) and
distinctive African American names (like Latoya and Jermaine), randomly adding addresses
in both affluent and “bad” neighborhoods. See id. at 995–96, 1003, 1012.
117. Id. at 998. A related study also looked to the effects of implicit bias when gender is
the differentiating factor. See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed
Criteria: Redefining Merit To Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474 (2005). The
candidates, one male and one female were alternatively attributed the characteristics of
“streetwise” and “booksmart.” Id. at 475. Participants consistently favored the male
candidate, regardless of how he was characterized, and then accordingly described the
criteria they found most relevant. Id.
118. See generally Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The
Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000).
119. Id. at 736.
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C. Pros and Cons: The Current Debate Over Implicit Bias
Given the recent cases120 and the abundance of scholarly articles dealing
with implicit bias, individuals concerned with implicit bias’s role in future
Title VII jurisprudence have created a heated debate on the topic. This
section presents the arguments against and in favor of the recognition of
implicit bias in employment discrimination claims.
1. Disfavoring Implicit Bias: Discretion and Deference
The most frequent criticisms of implicit bias question the scientific
validity of the IAT’s findings.121 While touted by supporters as hard
evidence of the pervasiveness of implicit biases in today’s society,122 not all
scholars are convinced that the IAT actually proves anything. They claim
that the “scientific” label attributed to the IAT studies may be nothing more
than an honorific title attributed by scholars aiming to use the IAT to help
reform antidiscrimination law, not an actual scientific validation of implicit
bias’s pervasiveness.123
One of the main features of this criticism arises from the difficulties of
distinguishing causation from correlation.124 First, there are numerous
theories that can explain the correlation between the IAT scores and real
world behavior without resort to the popular theory that virtually everyone
is inflicted with a biased attitude towards certain groups.125 Failure to
eliminate these plausible alternatives may render any conclusions based on

120. See infra Part II.
121. See generally Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the
Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006) [hereinafter Mitchell & Tetlock,
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading]; Gregory Mitchell & Philip E.
Tetlock, Facts Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737 (2009). But see
Harriet M. Antczak, Problems at Daubert: Expert Testimony in Title VII Sex Discrimination
and Sexual Harassment Litigation, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 33, 36–38 (2011)
(arguing that the premature exclusion of expert testimony in employment discrimination
claims may do more harm than good).
122. See supra Part I.B.1–3.
123. Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, supra
note 121, at 1029 (arguing that the IAT is claimed as scientifically sound by the “sheer
volume of laboratory studies that implicit prejudice advocates cite, by the moral certitude
with which [social scientists] apply psychological generalizations to the real world, and by
the impressive credentials [social scientists] bring to the courtroom.”).
124. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
997, 1049 (2006) (“In short, whether attitudes predict behavior depends on the attitude, the
context, and the person.”); see also Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the
Perils of Mindreading, supra note 121, at 1094; infra notes 189, 192 and accompanying text.
125. See Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
supra note 121, at 1064. Such alternative theories include: (1) the psychological phenomena
that the brain will simplify a task by focusing on only one category, rather than both; (2) an
individual’s fear of being labeled a bigot; (3) the creation of a “self-fulfilling prophecy”; (4)
sympathy for, rather than bias against, certain protected groups; and (5) cultural
expectations, rather than individual preferences. Id. at 1074–85; see also Maurice Wexler et
al., Implicit Bias and Employment Law: A Voyage into the Unknown, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar.
1, 2013, at 1 (“[I]nfinite factors may influence an individual’s response on the IAT.”).
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the IAT incomplete.126 Additionally, evaluators of the IAT have yet to
delineate a specific range of IAT scores that can accurately predict when an
implicit bias will lead to an actual discriminatory act.127 At this point, far
too many unknown variables may exist to definitively say that the IAT
reflects actual outward behavior for which an individual can be held
accountable.128
Another facet of the criticism involves the IAT data itself. Evaluations of
the IAT data demonstrate a low correlation to actual prejudicial behavior.129
Therefore, many of those who demonstrate an implicit bias based on the
IAT may never manifest any discriminatory behaviors.130 Essentially, the
proclaimed predictive power of the IAT is turned on its head. The
persuasiveness of this predictive power is weakened even more in the
employment context because of the training that decisionmakers, but not the
average IAT taker, receive to effectively make employment-related
decisions.131 Moreover, compilations of the data do not consider any
outlier test results: a small portion of IAT takers could be extremely biased,
while average test takers may possess negligible biases.132 Finally, some
may doubt that an unconscious bias could be evidenced by a mere
millisecond difference in reaction times, especially when the IAT does not
control for outside variables that may also affect these times.133
Opponents express concern over the potential implications of adopting a
test—like the IAT—that fails to meet the evidentiary standards of either the
scientific or legal community.134 Critics believe that the implicit bias
studies are not yet properly vetted in such a way as to give them credence as

126. See Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
supra note 121, at 1096–97.
127. See id. at 1032; see also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup
Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 163 (2004);
Wexler et al., supra note 125, at 5 (“While it looks objective, [the IAT] lacks any objective
connection to legally actionable behavior.”).
128. See Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
supra note 121, at 1068–69.
129. See id. at 1100.
130. See id.; cf. supra note 93 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, supra note 121, at 1108–10; Outreach, Education & Technical Assistance,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/outreach/index.cfm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (providing an example of the training available to employers).
132. Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, supra
note 121, at 1103.
133. See id. at 1033, 1047; Wexler et al., supra note 125, at 4 (“One person’s responses on
the IAT may also differ from day to day, and nothing in the test accounts for this
variability.”).
134. See Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
supra note 121, at 1028. For example, these critics find it both impractical and unorthodox
to force federal judicial appointees to take the IAT before confirmation. See id. Other
concerns arise from the potential that the IAT findings will lead to: (1) “debiasing” as a
remedy for unconscious discrimination, (2) invasions of schools to recondition children’s
implicit biases, and (3) other related measures. See id. at 1027–28.
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probative evidence in an antidiscrimination suit.135 Until the implicit bias
theory reaches an acceptable level of scientific validity, the risk of “false
positives” of implicit bias is too great to support reliance in the legal
landscape.136
Finally, the judiciary is concerned with several difficulties and
uncertainties that arise when confronted with possible instances of implicit
bias. These cases often look suspicious, as if some discrimination has
occurred, but the characteristic “smoking gun”—explicit discriminatory
statements—present in much of the early Title VII litigation are largely
absent.137 Similarly, the framework created by the early Title VII cases
focused on intentional or conscious discrimination,138 and this framework
may be unable to accommodate instances of unintentional discrimination
without undergoing serious changes that the courts are currently unwilling
to make.139
Furthermore, the judiciary is reluctant to punish instances of implicit
bias–related discrimination for several other reasons. First, the courts view
unconscious discrimination as less morally reprehensible than intentional
discrimination, and they are therefore somewhat hesitant to punish it under
the same framework that Title VII creates.140 Second, courts see an
employer’s organizational structure and business-related choices as matters
exclusively within an employer’s expertise and do not want to intervene.141
Finally, many courts feel resignation because of the ease with which
135. See id. at 1056 (“[I]f the goal is application to the law, implicit prejudice research
does not yet pass minimum standards of reliable science.”); see also Justin D. Levinson,
Huajian Cai, & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty
Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 187–88 (2010) (“Legal analysts have
implicitly assumed that existing social cognition measures, many of which are carefully
developed and rigorously tested (but not developed with the law in mind), are the only
options for theory development in the legal context.”); Wexler et al., supra note 125, at 3
(“[I]t is premature to incorporate the theory of implicit bias into employment discrimination
law.”).
136. Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, supra
note 121, at 1032–33.
137. See Green, supra note 98, at 105; Lee, supra note 3, at 482.
138. See supra Part I.A. While the disparate impact framework may arise due to an
unintentional effect of a business practice, the employer is likely at least somewhat aware of
any impact on protected groups. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987
(1988) (noting that some unintentionally discriminatory employment practices may arise to
the functional equivalent of intentional discrimination).
139. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 3, at 483; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights
Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1332–
33 (1998) (“[N]either our cultural understandings nor our jurisprudential models of
discrimination illuminate or provide ways to reckon with [subtle, incremental forms of
discrimination].”); Wexler et al., supra note 125, at 2 (“Importing the theory of implicit bias
into the jurisprudence of employment law would require an equally nuanced and complex
approach.”).
140. See Poirier, supra note 109, at 461; Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (pointing out the
judiciary’s refusal to recognize several forms of employment discrimination).
141. See Green, supra note 98, at 118; Green & Kalev, supra note 101, at 1460; see also
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (“[C]ourts are generally less
competent than employers to restructure business practices and [therefore should not attempt
to do so].” (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978))).
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employers can pass the buck and say that any discriminatory impact created
by implicit biases was entirely beyond their control, effectively creating an
affirmative defense to allegations of discrimination142—they do not want to
spend time creating a remedy and wasting judicial resources when nearly
zero likelihood of employee success exists.
2. Supporting Implicit Bias: The Evolution of the Law
One of Title VII’s main goals was to combat all forms of discrimination
against members of protected groups.143 As such, supporters argue that
recognizing implicit bias as a form of Title VII employment discrimination
would be fully compatible with the intent of the sponsors and major
proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.144 A new interpretation that
recognizes unconscious discrimination would support Title VII even better
than a refusal to acknowledge the impact of implicit biases on
decisionmaking processes, because it would reflect the current state of
discrimination in the workplace.145
Additionally, if Title VII is to be viewed as a living statute that changes
with social and behavioral developments, supporters assert that the
invidious intent model of antidiscrimination laws represents an outdated
view that runs contrary to the scientific studies.146 Further, as supporters
point out, the EEOC has incorporated “unconscious stereotypes” into its
definition of intentional discrimination.147 Noting that the judiciary’s
interpretation of Title VII generally lags behind modern social trends,148
supporters argue that the courts should consider these new scientific
142. Green & Kalev, supra note 101, at 1459–60; Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (“Deliberate
racism has been replaced by cognitive bias that influences the decision making and
interactions involving [minority] workers.”).
143. See supra notes 3, 23 and accompanying text. Compare this goal to the general
observation that employees bringing claims against their employers for employment
discrimination have an exceedingly slim chance of success. See, e.g., Ritenhouse, supra note
23; Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1153 (2008)
(noting the hurdles that employees bringing Title VII employment discrimination cases face
at all stages of litigation).
144. See Lee, supra note 3, at 488; Shin, supra note 24, at 84.
145. Ritenhouse, supra note 23.
146. See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 753 (2001); Ann C. McGinley,
¡Viva la Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 415, 418 (2000); see also Paterson et al., supra note 86, at 1181 (“[T]oday’s Court
continues to operate in this ‘imaginary world’ despite mounting evidence that the Intent
Doctrine is not only outdated, but almost entirely ineffective in addressing racial
discrimination or inequality.”); Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (“[C]ourts have lagged behind in
addressing the prevalence of subtle racial discrimination that plagues today’s minority
employees.”). Viewing the intent requirement as the exception, rather than the rule, may
bring American antidiscrimination jurisprudence into line with that of other countries. See
Paterson et al., supra note 86, at 1196–97 (identifying Canadian law, South African law, and
several international treaties that do not require intent).
147. See Questions and Answers About Race and Color Discrimination in Employment,
U.S.
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
qanda_race_color.html (last updated May 16, 2006).
148. See, e.g., Paterson et al., supra note 86, at 1186; Ritenhouse, supra note 23.
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findings in their Title VII jurisprudence, rather than allow these findings to
be entirely disregarded or viewed too skeptically.149 Alternatively,
supporters urge Congress to amend Title VII to reflect these modern trends.
Finally, over the nearly fifty years since the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, employers have discovered the types of liability they face for
discriminatory employment decisions. Now that these employers have the
skill and ability to avoid “documenting, outwardly expressing, or retaining”
evidence of any infringement of Title VII,150 supporters suggest that
recognizing implicit bias would send a message that the government is
serious about ending discrimination and is willing to hold these clever
employers liable for their conduct, intentional or not.151
II. IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE COURTS: IS IT REALLY
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION?
Given Title VII’s historical application to cases of overt or invidious
employment discrimination,152 the courts have not found a uniform way to
recognize discrimination based on implicit bias. While some courts have
recognized implicit bias under Title VII, an almost equal number of courts
have not. This Part presents a number of cases exemplifying each
approach.
A. Rejecting Implicit Bias Claims: The Ambiguities
of Employment Decisions
Several courts have recognized the difficulties inherent in determining
whether alleged employment discrimination resulted from unintentional
stereotypes and attitudes or permissible discretion and legitimate business
decisions. On several occasions, these courts have determined that
nondiscriminatory reasons, rather than any implicit biases, led to an
employment decision. These courts also typically reject the notion that
implicit biases influence employment decisions at all. This section explores
a sample of recent cases decided by the Supreme Court and two district
courts where implicit biases could have played a part in employers’
decisions, but where the courts have not felt the need to address such biases.

149. See Shin, supra note 24, at 80 (“If one were to approach the statute afresh rather than
through the lens of Supreme Court precedent, one might very well read it to permit the
imposition of liability for unconscious bias.”); Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (“The plain
language of Title VII does not mandate proof of purposeful or intentional discrimination.”).
See generally Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2009)
(arguing that social framework testimony on stereotyping and bias should be allowed to
expand Title VII’s reach).
150. Lee, supra note 3, at 488; see also Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (“[D]ecision makers
have become more and more sophisticated in hiding discriminatory intentions.”).
151. See Lee, supra note 3, at 488.
152. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (noting the traditional
requirement of intent for Title VII employment discrimination claims).
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In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,153 the Supreme Court heard an appeal
in a class action lawsuit regarding a pattern and practice of discrimination
against female Wal-Mart employees.154 The putative class consisted of 1.5
million female employees155 claiming that a pattern and practice of
discrimination existed against women because pay and promotion decisions
were left to local managers’ broad, subjective discretion.156
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia expressed some skepticism when
explaining the circumstances surrounding the named plaintiffs.157 The
majority found that, without further, specific proof of nationwide
discrimination, most store managers could not possibly have discriminated
against all employees throughout the country because Wal-Mart’s
employment policies specifically forbade discrimination on the basis of
gender (and imposed penalties for violations).158 Highlighting an additional
problem, Justice Scalia noted that, even if the class action were to go
forward, all managers would simply claim that they applied “sex-neutral,
performance-based criteria” to rebut any claim of discrimination.159
Rather, the plaintiffs were required to identify a specific employment
practice.160 Ultimately, the Court refused to certify the class.161
One of the most recent rejections of an implicit bias legal theory occurred
in Pippen v. Iowa, a class action lawsuit in which African American state
employees brought claims of disparate impact against the thirty-seven
departments of the state executive branch regarding the administration of
Iowa’s merit-based employment hiring and promotion system.162 The crux
of the employees’ claim was that the merit-based system was designed to

153. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
154. Id. at 2547–48.
155. Id. at 2547.
156. Id. at 2548 (“[Wal-Mart’s] strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ permits bias
against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each
one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers.”).
157. See id. at 2547–48. For example, Betty Dukes was promoted and then later demoted
after several disciplinary actions. See id. at 2547–48. Similarly, Christine Kwapnoski held a
number of positions, which included a supervisor position, but complained that the managers
only screamed at the female employees and made several sexist comments. See id. Finally,
Edith Arana claimed that she was ignored by her store manager when inquiring about
management training, but failed to apply directly for the position after being told, and was
later fired for violating Wal-Mart’s timekeeping policy. See id. Moreover, Justice Scalia
found a social science analysis regarding the impact of stereotypes on employment
discrimination to be too vague to provide sufficient evidence to establish this class. See id. at
2553.
158. Id. at 2554–55 (“Left to their own devices most managers in any corporation . . .
would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce
no actionable disparity at all.”); see also id. at 2553. Wal-Mart also had another policy of
allowing local management the discretion to deal with local employment matters. See id. at
2554.
159. Id. at 2555.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 2561.
162. Pippen v. Iowa, No. LACL107038, slip op. at 1 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012),
appeal filed, No. 12-0913 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2012).
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limit opportunities for African American employees,163 and it had
effectively succumbed to favoritism, excluding the African American
employees in violation of Title VII and the Iowa state law equivalent.164
Iowa’s executive branch is divided into thirty-seven departments of
varying responsibilities and funding, each possessing independent hiring
authority.165 The merit-based system serves as a guidepost for each of
these departments, requiring them to make all personnel decisions “solely
on the basis of merit and fitness, to be ascertained by examinations or other
appropriate screening methods.”166 The Department of Administrative
Services (DAS) oversees the process for the entire executive branch and has
the responsibility of developing guidelines for efficient employment
decisionmaking, as well as overseeing the proper implementation of the
guidelines in each department.167 The DAS carries out its duties by
monitoring compliance throughout the executive branch, taking action to
enforce the guidelines when necessary,168 and collecting data throughout
the state regarding Iowa’s state employee affirmative action practices.169
All job applicants similarly submit their applications through the DAS’s
online system, or occasionally by hard copy.170 Despite the DAS’s role,
each department still retains autonomy regarding all hiring and promotion
decisions.171
The DAS’s overall system can be divided into three steps that become
increasingly more particularized the further along a candidate advances.172
Once a given candidate advances past the DAS’s referral round, the
departments are given greater leeway to individualize the screening and
interview process based on specific job-related needs.173
The class members’ anecdotal evidence included a number of situations
in which they were incorrectly classified during the screening process, such
163. See id. at 3. The class claim also highlights that the decisionmaking process was
largely subjective and discretionary. Id. at 4.
164. See id. at 3.
165. See id. at 17.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 18.
168. See id. at 19.
169. Id. at 21. The DAS’s data collection falls into three categories. First, it collects “job
information,” which includes the basics regarding the type of job, what minimum
requirements applicants must meet, and pay. See id. Second, the DAS collects “applicant
information,” such as the age, race, and gender data provided by each applicant. See id.
Finally, the DAS collects “application information,” which includes which individuals are
competing for a job, how far along in the hiring process each applicant made it, and,
occasionally, why a given applicant was not selected. See id.
170. Id. at 22.
171. Id. at 20, 22.
172. See id. at 21–22. In the “Step One” referral process, the DAS screens all applicants
to determine whether they meet the minimum requirements for the available job, advancing
all qualified applicants to the relevant executive branch department’s individual hiring
department. Id. at 21–22. In “Step Two,” the hiring department performs its own screening
process and selects potential candidates for interviews. Id. at 21. Finally, “Step Three”
consists of the actual interviews and selection of candidates for hire or promotion. Id.
173. Id. at 22–23 (“[P]ractices and procedures become more individualized to a given
department and a particular job.”).
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that they were effectively (and improperly) removed from consideration for
an open position despite their qualifications. Caucasian employees (and
one Asian employee) were not alleged to have received the same
treatment.174 In addition to the submission of statistical data,175 the class
presented testimony regarding implicit bias from Dr. Anthony Greenwald
and Dr. Cheryl Kaiser to further bolster their claim.176 Dr. Greenwald
mainly focused on the IAT177 and his findings that all persons possess some
level of implicit bias towards one race or another.178 Dr. Kaiser, on the
other hand, focused on the range of implicit and explicit biases that
everyone possesses,179 as well as how implicit biases could pervade
subjective decisionmaking in ambiguous situations.180 Though stating that
the merit-based system was specifically designed to avoid discrimination,
the DAS also recognized that biases could potentially invade the hiring
process.181
Although the court considered the legislative history of Title VII and
briefly addressed the changing nature of discrimination,182 the court still
noted both the uniqueness of the class’s claims183 and the lack of precedent
for its legal theory.184 While the court’s main holding rejected the class’s
claims because of a failure to identify a specific employment practice,185
the court also looked to whether the class could prove causation, even if the
entire hiring process could be considered inseparable.186 After finding
errors and ambiguities in the statistical analyses,187 the court turned its
attention to the implicit bias testimony.188 First, the court generally focused
on how implicit bias does not necessarily translate into actual prejudicial

174. See id. at 24–27. In some instances, the DAS incorrectly reported an applicant as
unqualified, and, when informed of the error, stated that the hiring department already had
another candidate in mind. See id. at 24–25. Other instances saw candidates rejected based
upon criteria that were not included in the provided job description or based upon factors
that were not evaluated during the interview process. See id. at 25–27. Still other class
members stated that they did not believe they were the most qualified for the job, or were
rejected for reasons such as trying to work outside the hiring system. See id. at 26–27. On
one occasion, the department ceased hiring for a certain position altogether after a white
applicant declined the offer. Id. at 26.
175. See id. at 31–36.
176. Id. at 27–31.
177. Id. at 28.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 30.
180. See id. Dr. Kaiser also highlighted how racial cues pervade resumes even when the
employer has not seen the applicant. Id. at 31.
181. Id. at 18.
182. See id. at 5.
183. Id. at 36.
184. Id. at 37.
185. See id. at 46 (“The ‘entire hiring process’ is not a particular employment practice.”).
186. Id. at 47.
187. See id. at 47–51. For example, the court determined that the class’s statistical data
regarding disparities in hiring and promoting African Americans did not consider how
African American job applicants typically applied to more jobs overall than Caucasian
applicants. Id. at 50.
188. See id. at 52.
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behavior.189 Next, the court determined that any IAT results were
inadmissible because there was no evidence that any Iowa decisionmakers
took the IAT190 and because Dr. Greenwald did not evaluate any hiring files
for the Iowa state employees.191 The mere plausibility that implicit bias
could have played a role in the decisions was insufficient to show
causation,192 especially when the class conceded that subjectivity and
implicit bias could not be eliminated completely from the employment
decisionmaking process.193 Because of the extreme variability and
uncertainty as to actual causation, the class’s disparate impact claim was
rejected.194
Third, in Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.,195 Myrtle Thomas brought a
disparate treatment claim of employment discrimination against her former
employer, Eastman Kodak (Kodak).196 Thomas was laid off after working
in the same office for thirteen years. She was the only African American
customer support representative.197
The District of Massachusetts found that Kodak used a “Performance
Appraisal” system to evaluate and reward each employee for meritorious
job performance.198 Thomas’s evaluations were largely positive and also
showed that she received several awards and bonuses for her job
performance.199 Kodak eventually decided to create a new management
position, to which Thomas applied.200 However, Thomas’s application was
denied on the basis that she was unqualified, and a secretary named Claire
Flannery was hired instead.201 Flannery’s promotion put her in a position
to review Thomas, and was followed by several clashes between Thomas
and Flannery.202 When Thomas received her annual evaluation that year,
she discovered that Flannery gave her a lower rating than all of the other
customer service representatives.203 Flannery claimed that Thomas could
not receive a score higher than three because of the recent change in

189. See id. at 29.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 30.
192. See id. at 54 (calling the social science testimony an “opinion of conjecture, not
proof of causation”). Dr. Greenwald was also unable to rule out other race-neutral causes for
the employment decisions. See id. at 30.
193. Id. at 53. Ultimately, the court chose to defer to employers’ expertise in the business
world, rather than getting involved. See id.
194. See id. at 51 (“The causes could be anything as egregious as explicit bias or as
benign as extremely specific job requirements.”).
195. 18 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 1998), rev’d, 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
196. Id. at 131.
197. Id.
198. See id. (describing that the appraisal system rated each employee numerically in
several areas, but also considered written comments).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 132.
201. Id. At the time, Thomas was studying for a master’s degree in business and was
more senior than Flannery. Id.
202. See id. For example, Flannery gave Thomas the wrong time for a customer meeting
and then refused to explain the incident to the customer. Id.
203. Id.
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Thomas’s wage grade at Eastman Kodak.204 Regardless, Thomas still
received pay raises for two of the three years she worked under Flannery,
even though she was eventually laid off, as a result of her lower scores.205
Finding for Kodak, the court determined that Thomas provided
insufficient evidence to prove that Flannery was motivated by racial animus
when annually evaluating Thomas’s performance.206 As such, the court
found that Flannery and Thomas merely had conflicting personalities.207
Thus, without a showing of discriminatory animus, the court declined to say
that Thomas was discriminated against based merely on a presumably
unfriendly office environment and suspiciously unfair treatment by an
immediate supervisor.208
B. Recognizing Implicit Bias in the Courts: More Than Mere Discretion
While the Supreme Court and some lower courts have been hesitant to
recognize the existence of implicit bias in cases alleging employment
discrimination, such reluctance is not universal. This section explores
representative cases from various federal courts that have acknowledged not
only the phenomenon of unconscious bias, but also the cognitive science
research examining implicit biases and their effect on employment
decisions.
In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,209 the D.C. Circuit confronted one of
the earliest cases dealing with mixed-motive discrimination.210 At the time,
a senior partner and a policy board, elected by all Price Waterhouse
partners, controlled all of the company’s business-related decisions.211
Many partners were hired from within the company, through a formal
review process.212 Once nominated for partnership, a candidate’s name was
circulated to all partners, who then had the chance to comment on the
candidate’s job performance.213 Partners who worked closely with the
candidate were permitted to fill out a detailed “long-form” evaluation, while
those who did not only filled out a “short-form” evaluation.214 Each
evaluation provided reasoning for why the candidate should or should not
be promoted.215 Once all evaluations were complete, a committee prepared
a summary of all comments, added its own recommendations, and then
provided these materials to the policy board.216 Upon review of the

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. Kodak had no such policy. See id.
See id. at 131–32.
See id. at 138.
See id.
Id.
825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 470.
Id. at 461.
See id.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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materials, the policy board voted on the candidate, considering both
individual merit and the business needs of the firm.217
Ann Hopkins, the sole female employee in the Office of Government
Services, was passed over for partner despite her outstanding
qualifications218 and praise from the partners in her department.219
Ultimately, the policy board’s rejection commentary pointed to Hopkins’s
aggressive personality and her lack of interpersonal skills with clients and
other staff members alike.220 Her defenders within the policy board,
however, stated that many male candidates and partners were much worse
than Hopkins, and that she would be an excellent partner if the policy board
could ignore her “macho” characteristics.221
Without outright denying Hopkins’s bid for partner, the policy board
determined that she needed to undergo a “quality control review.” This
review would assuage any concerns, and would permit her to demonstrate
her skills to the partners by working more closely with them.222 To give
Hopkins a little extra help, one of the partners even told her that she should
act and dress more like a woman to help reduce her macho image.223
On the one hand, the lower court found that the criticism of Hopkins’s
aggressive personality was genuine and unrelated to her gender.224
However, the court also found that the Price Waterhouse corporate culture
was rife with sexual stereotyping, which the firm took no action to
discourage.225 In the end, the district court determined that it would be
unable to evaluate the exact effect that gender stereotyping played on Price
Waterhouse partnership decisions.226
Relying on the testimony of an expert on stereotyping, Dr. Susan
Fiske,227 the D.C. Circuit found that the “disappointed stereotypical
expectations of male partners played a ‘major determining role’ in the
firm’s decision not to make Hopkins a partner.”228 Finding an intent
requirement less necessary, the court looked to the sophistication and
217. Id.
218. See id. The district court noted that, not only was Hopkins a skilled businesswoman
capable of generating business and closing high-profile contracts for the firm, but she also
brought in the most business in the year she was considered for partner and billed more
hours than any other partner candidate. Id.
219. See id. Citing her past performance, the partners provided a “flattering appraisal of
her work,” and enthusiastically pushed for Hopkins’s promotion to partner. Id.
220. See id. at 463 (noting that the policy board found Hopkins “overly aggressive,
unduly harsh, impatient with staff, and very demanding”).
221. Id.
222. Id. However, this quality control review would prove futile for Hopkins once her
supervising partners later became opposed to her candidacy for partnership. See id.
223. Id. (“[The partner] advised her to walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”).
224. See id. at 464.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 464–65
227. Id. at 465, 467. Dr. Fiske’s testimony highlighted the combination of factors that
supported Hopkins’s claim of stereotyping, such as the lack of other female candidates,
ambiguous criteria for partnership, and the lack of objective standards. See id.
228. Id.

2013]

EVERYONE’S A LITTLE BIT RACIST?

153

educational background of the alleged discriminators and decided that
stereotyping is much less excusable for individuals with the experience and
education that Price Waterhouse partners possessed.229 Finally, by
emphasizing the unintentional form that stereotyping sometimes takes, the
D.C. Circuit broke new ground by stating that unconscious or unintentional
discrimination is equally as serious and harmful as overt, invidious
discrimination. As such, the court had an equal duty to protect against this
unconscious discrimination.230
Meanwhile, on appeal from the district court’s decision, the First Circuit
handled the facts of Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.231 very differently from
the district court. First, the court highlighted that Thomas was the only
African American customer service representative working for Eastman
Kodak’s Wellesley office at the time.232 Further, the court delved deeper
into an analysis of Eastman Kodak’s evaluation process.233 For example,
the First Circuit noted that the evaluations were placed on a company-wide
curve that ranked the employees.234 Moreover, the First Circuit placed
greater weight on Thomas’s past performance than the district court. The
First Circuit also highlighted that: (1) Thomas’s office was never
dissatisfied with her work prior to Flannery’s arrival, (2) Eastman Kodak
evaluated Thomas to perform at a level above and beyond her colleagues,
and (3) Thomas received praise from both her customers and her
coworkers.235
The First Circuit stated that the requirements of disparate treatment could
be satisfied even if an employer discriminates based on unconscious
biases,236 notably shifting away from the court’s past requirements of
invidious intent to discriminate. Denouncing the district court’s conclusion
that Flannery’s behavior merely showed evidence of an unwelcoming office
environment and a personality conflict with Thomas,237 the First Circuit
noted that Flannery’s behavior was also possibly inappropriate and
unprofessional.238 Relying purely on the change in Thomas’s evaluation
scores pre- and post-Flannery, the First Circuit held that strong evidence of
discrimination existed,239 reversing the district court’s dismissal of
Thomas’s claim.240

229. See id. at 468.
230. See id. at 469 (“[T]he fact that some or all of the partners at Price Waterhouse may
have been unaware of that motivation, even within themselves, neither alters the fact of its
existence nor excuses it.”).
231. 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
232. Id. at 42.
233. See id. at 44.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 43.
236. See id. at 58.
237. See id. at 64; see also supra Part II.A.
238. See Thomas, 183 F.3d at 64.
239. Id. at 62.
240. Id. at 65.
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Most recently, the Eastern District of Wisconsin considered the role of
implicit bias in employment decisions in Kimble v. Wisconsin Department
of Workforce Development.241 In Kimble, an African American supervisor
working in the Equal Rights Division (ERD) for twenty-nine years, brought
suit against his employer, the Wisconsin Department of Workforce
Development, alleging race and gender discrimination after he was denied a
raise.242
The Court found that, while the ERD had provisions for awarding meritbased raises and bonuses,243 these provisions were extremely general,
necessitating the addition of actual criteria.244 However, the ERD never
established any specific policies.245 As a result, the ERD essentially had
free reign to subjectively decide when to award raises and bonuses, without
any objective checks against the decisionmaker’s biases. The ERD’s chief
decisionmaker, J. Sheehan Donoghue, who had no first-hand experience
with Kimble,246 determined that Kimble’s performance did not merit a
raise,247 claiming to have relied on the annual evaluations of Kimble’s other
supervisors.248
However, at trial, no supervisors stated that they were asked for any
Moreover, had Donoghue consulted these
recommendations.249
recommendations as she claimed, she would have seen that Kimble’s
reviews were mostly positive.250 But Donoghue was so detached from
Kimble that she failed to realize that he felt neglected at work,251 instead
viewing him as an incompetent employee.252
Finding that Donoghue discriminated against Kimble, the court relied on
the subjectivity of Donoghue’s decisionmaking process and the lack of any
meaningful review of her decisions.253 Given these factors, the court found
an opening through which any biases or stereotypes could infect the
decisionmaking process.254 Specifically, this court became the first to
explicitly recognize and rely on implicit bias cognitive studies in reaching
its holding.255

241. 690 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
242. Id. at 767.
243. Id. at 768.
244. See id. at 772.
245. Id.
246. See id. In fact, the extent of Donoghue’s direct contact with Kimble occurred on the
occasions when she used his office to store her purse and papers while on site. See id. at 776.
247. Id. at 772.
248. Id. at 773.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 777 (noting that Kimble was unable to participate at any employment
meetings without having another employee corroborate what he was saying).
252. Id. at 776–77.
253. See id. at 776.
254. See id. (“Individuals draw lines and create categories based in part on race, gender
and ethnicity, and the stereotypes they create can bias how they process and interpret
information and how they judge other people.”).
255. See Kimble, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (citing the major literature on implicit biases).
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III. THE NECESSITY OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Currently, there is no easy way to incorporate implicit bias into
employment discrimination law. Practically, Congress is so deadlocked in
general that a bipartisan agreement to make a major structural change to
Title VII seems unrealistic,256 and Congress would likely wait for intense
public support before even considering this type of reform.257 However,
now is a perfect time for a judicial intervention, or at least a willingness to
explore possible solutions to this newly identified type of employment
discrimination. Although courts have expressed an unwillingness to
intervene in matters best left to employer discretion,258 they have
previously taken it upon themselves to modify the Title VII framework to
address newly discovered forms of discrimination.259
First, this Part argues that the cases presented in Part II.A were
improperly decided, because the courts failed to seriously consider the
effects of implicit bias. Additionally, this Part asserts three reasons—
purposivism, textualism, and consistency through the Title VII legal
framework—that favor the judiciary using Title VII as an interventional
means to eliminate unconscious bias in the employment setting. Next, this
Part demonstrates that judicial intervention is necessary if the courts want to
serve the main aim of Title VII—eliminating all forms of employment
discrimination. Then, this Part advocates that a broader interpretation of the
language of Title VII is applicable to cases alleging implicit bias–induced
employment discrimination. Finally, this Part explains how the current
burden-shifting framework under disparate impact, disparate treatment, and
mixed-motive cases can be applied with equal force and minimal changes to
cases alleging implicit bias as a form of employment discrimination.
A. The Pervasiveness of Implicit Bias: Why They Got It Wrong
While cases like Dukes, Pippen, and Thomas clearly recognize the
practical difficulties of identifying implicit bias in potential instances of
employment discrimination,260 each makes the faulty assumption that the
impact of implicit biases is so negligible or its existence so unlikely that it
could be ignored entirely.
This major flaw in the Dukes Court’s reasoning261 was obvious, as
Justice Scalia tried to ascertain the male managers’ motivations and
effectively rejected the possibility that the store managers had an improper
motive, unconscious or otherwise.262 By refusing to consider the
proposition that the Wal-Mart managers could have discriminated against
the female employees, the Dukes majority equally rejected the notion that

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See, e.g., supra note 30.
See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 153–61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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implicit biases are pervasive throughout society263 and have a real impact
on decisionmaking.264 On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
demonstrated the possibility of recognizing implicit bias, while still denying
relief to a gigantic class of individuals.265
The Pippen court went to similar extreme ends to avoid giving credence
to the implicit bias theory in a massive class action suit against the entire
state executive branch.266 The crux of the error that the Iowa state court
made in this case stemmed from that court’s refusal to find causation based
upon the statistical evidence and cognitive studies on implicit bias.267 By
refusing to treat Dr. Greenwald’s implicit bias analysis seriously, the Iowa
state district court essentially found that—despite the plausibility268 that
implicit bias played a role in the executive branch’s hiring practices—the
lack of specific IAT data regarding the implicit attitudes of Iowa state
employees was compelling enough to totally disregard the entire theory.269
The court, in effect, supported the view that for an implicit bias theory to
succeed, the employer whose practices are at issue should be required to
take the IAT. This view presents the practical problem, however, of
invading the privacy of the employers at issue. If the court willingly
accepted other criticisms of the IAT, it surely would have recognized that
forcing the IAT upon employers would impede business duties, and would
fall back on the popular reasoning that everyone has implicit biases.270
Moreover, the Iowa state district court in Thomas made the equally faulty
assumption that, even though Thomas was the only African American
customer support representative at the Wellesley Kodak office, Thomas’s
treatment by Flannery was due only to their incompatible personalities and
an unfriendly (but not discriminatory) workplace.271 Here, the court
essentially rejected the premise of the social contact theory, which states

263. For a discussion on the pervasiveness of implicit bias, see supra notes 93–97 and
accompanying text.
264. See supra Part I.B.2.
265. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561, 2563–64 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Though not dispositive of bias,
suspicions are raised by the fact that a large majority of Wal-Mart’s managerial positions are
occupied by men, who are left to make “arbitrary and subjective” managerial decisions. Id.
at 2563. Without any specific criteria for setting wages, there are no checks upon the
unconscious biases that may have infected these subjective decisions. See id. at 2564. To
dispose the claim, Justice Ginsburg stated her belief that the class was certified under the
wrong subsection of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See id. at 2561.
266. See supra notes 162, 194 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 187–93 and accompanying text.
268. Plausibility is greater than a mere possibility. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557–58 (2007) (highlighting the need to state additional facts to cross the line from
mere possibility to plausibility).
269. See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text. The District of Massachusetts also
appeared to accept the views criticizing the validity of the IAT, despite the myriad legal
scholarship in support of its findings. See supra Part I.C.2.
270. See supra Part I.B.1–3 (discussing the pervasiveness of implicit bias); supra note
125 (noting the self-fulfilling prophecy of unconscious discrimination).
271. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
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that contact with diverse individuals reduces the impact of implicit bias.272
Because Thomas was the only African American employee in that office, it
would have been more prudent of the court to be skeptical of Flannery’s
motives, rather than deferential to them.273
By rejecting the social science findings and, thus, evidence of the
existence of implicit bias, the courts in each of these three cases effectively
undermined Title VII’s primary goal of eliminating all forms of
discrimination.274 Without an expansion of Title VII to cover implicit bias,
many employees remain powerless to seek a remedy for this type of
employment discrimination. This is especially true when virtually no court
is willing to experiment with variations on the accepted legal framework to
develop a workable manner in which to recognize a remedy for
discrimination caused by implicit bias.
B. Ending All Forms of Employment Discrimination Means Recognizing
That Discrimination Is Not Only Based on Conscious Intent
Judicial recognition of implicit biases within the Title VII framework
would greatly further the legislative goals of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.275 This would not be the first time that the judiciary has taken an
active role in expanding Title VII when new, potentially harmful and
discriminatory employment practices are revealed.276 Given the cognitive
science research on implicit biases, such a development has been brought to
the courts’ attention on several occasions.277
Title VII’s broad purpose is to end all forms of employment
discrimination.278 When the Supreme Court recognized that certain
aptitude tests served no legitimate purpose and had the effect of depriving
protected groups of employment opportunities, it adopted the disparate
impact formulation.279 Similarly, both the courts and Congress adopted the
mixed-motive framework upon recognizing that an employer could escape

272. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
273. Clearly the First Circuit decided to take this route, similar to how the D.C. Circuit
expressed skepticism of the Price Waterhouse partners’ decisions in Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 471–72 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228
(1989). See supra Part II.B.
274. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part I.A.2–3. Further, the judiciary has, both in the past and presently,
shown a willingness to treat antidiscrimination law flexibly. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) (calling for a flexible application of the
burden-shifting test outlined in the decision); Pippen v. Iowa, No. LACL107038, slip op. at 3
(Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012) (“The question here is not so much whether the law of equal
rights will evolve—it will.”), appeal filed, No. 12-0913 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2012);
Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 911, 950 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa abandoned a structural analysis in favor of a more flexible approach to proving
Title VII employment discrimination cases premised on a disparate impact theory).
277. See supra Part II.
278. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Part I.A.2.
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liability for an employment decision that was motivated by discriminatory
animus, but tempered by a legitimate business purpose.280 Once again, with
the legal impact of implicit biases becoming more prevalent and
contentious,281 the courts must adopt a new framework to protect
employees from a newly discovered form of discrimination.282
Subjective hiring and promotion decisionmaking have much the same
effect as an aptitude test,283 and is full of opportunities through which
implicit biases can infect employers’ choices.284 With both subjective
decisionmaking and aptitude tests, employees protected under Title VII
suffer a disadvantage, because these practices allow employers to
discriminate without actually intending to do so.285 Regardless, the
elimination of all types of employment discrimination necessarily includes
protecting employees against the effects of unconscious discrimination.
Thus, judicial recognition of, and protection against, implicit biases is
wholly inherent in any purposive interpretation of Title VII.286
C. The Plain Language of Title VII Supports Broadening Its Reach
Title VII, in its current incarnation, does not read as an outright bar to
recognizing implicit bias.287 Rather, Title VII can—and should—be read
more broadly by the courts to recognize that a case need not involve
intentional discrimination to merit a remedy. Cases like Kimble and the
First Circuit’s handling of Thomas demonstrate that Title VII is capable of
remedying the impact of implicit biases without radically rewriting the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.288
First, looking to § 2000e-2(a), the only indicator of intent is the
prohibition against discriminating “because of” race and other protected
characteristics.289 A strict reading of this phrase interprets “because of” to
require overt discrimination against a member of a protected group.
280. See supra Part I.A.3.
281. See supra Part II.
282. In addition to adapting the framework of traditional Title VII employment
discrimination claims in cases of disparate treatment, disparate impact, and mixed-motive
discrimination, the courts have also recognized new causes of action under Title VII, such as
sexual harassment claims, despite Congress’s failure to specifically provide for such relief.
See, e.g., Barbara L. Zalucki, Discrimination Law—Defining the Hostile Work Environment
Claim of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 11 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 143, 144–45 (1989).
283. See supra Part I.B.2.
284. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part I.A.2, I.B.3. Although employers may be more aware of a
discriminatory effect in disparate impact cases, this is not necessarily so. Regardless,
protected classes of employees face an adverse impact because of an employment practice
that is not facially discriminatory. See supra Part II.B. The inclusion of subjective
employment practices in the disparate impact framework furthers this conclusion. See supra
note 62 and accompanying text.
286. This is especially true if one believes that implicit bias is as pervasive as the social
science studies suggest. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
287. See Ritenhouse, supra note 23; supra note 149 and accompanying text.
288. See supra Part II.A. However, neither the Kimble court nor the First Circuit in
Thomas provided a textual analysis of Title VII. See supra Part II.B.
289. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). For the text of this section, see supra note 22.

2013]

EVERYONE’S A LITTLE BIT RACIST?

159

However, a broader reading of the phrase “because of” encompasses other
situations where the discrimination occurs as a result of any type of bias.290
In fact, discriminating “because of” a protected characteristic must include
implicit bias–induced discrimination that causes the employer to treat an
employee differently.
Though the intent to discriminate is often
unconscious when implicit bias is involved, implicit bias may still lead
decisionmakers to act in a certain discriminatory way.291 Further, though
the courts are hesitant to punish behavior over which an employer may not
have control, individuals that possess implicit biases are not helpless292—if
anything, recognition of implicit bias liability will lead decisionmakers to
take active steps to ensure that their decisions are legitimate.
Second, § 2000e-2(a) also encompasses any other decisions that
“adversely affect” an employee’s status.293 Again, an adverse effect need
not be caused by an obvious and invidious intent to discriminate.294 Any
type of bias that arises out of an unconscious attitude or stereotype that the
employer possesses can cause an adverse effect.295 A decision to promote a
Caucasian employee over an African American employee merely based on
a gut instinct rather than a bona fide difference in qualifications still causes
an adverse effect that would not otherwise exist if both employees were
Caucasian. The African American employee must then establish that
implicit bias impacted the employer’s decision, showing that this effect
actually did occur because of the African American employee’s race. Thus,
a broad reading of “adversely affect” encompasses implicit biases, without
the need to radically alter Title VII.296

290. For example, in Kimble v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, 690 F.
Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010), Kimble’s treatment in the Department of Workforce
Development occurred because of Donoghue’s potential implicit biases against him, though
he did not face any adverse impact because of a specific act that Donoghue performed. See
id. at 776; supra notes 241–55 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A.3 (discussing
the mixed-motive framework).
291. See supra Part I.B.
292. See supra notes 106, 113–14, and accompanying text (discussing how deliberation
and the social contact hypothesis help to combat the influence of implicit biases).
293. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
294. In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, Hopkin’s status as a Price Waterhouse employee
was adversely affected by the policy board’s penchant for sexual stereotyping, despite the
policy board’s lack of knowledge that such stereotyping occurred. 825 F.2d 458, 464 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Further, the disparate impact
framework recognizes that not all forms of discrimination will be wholly intentional. See
supra Part I.A.2.
295. See supra Part I.B; see also Kimble, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (explaining how
Donoghue’s behavior towards Kimble evinced the existence of implicit bias, and how this
behavior discriminated against Kimble).
296. Other similar statutes, namely the Americans with Disabilities Act, lend further
support to this argument. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (using the phrase “has the effect of”).
In this statute, Congress recognized that an employee could be discriminated against
regardless of an employer’s intent. While discriminating against disabled employees is a
serious problem, discrimination based on an employee’s status as a minority has a much
more prominent and infamous history within this country. However, the argument could
also be made that Congress knows how to write a statute to incorporate unintentional
discrimination, and that Congress chose not to include this standard in Title VII. Regardless,
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D. Shifting Burdens Maintain the Status Quo of Employment
Discrimination Claims and Implicit Bias
Because the broad language of Title VII supports considerations of
implicit bias, courts merely need to incorporate the implicit bias research
into the traditional burden-shifting standard to adequately combat all of
forms of employment discrimination.
Title VII’s legal framework
addresses virtually every type of employment discrimination claim.297
Because of the overall success of this framework, there is little need to
change it when recognizing a claim premised on an implicit bias theory.
Courts can maintain this framework to preserve Title VII’s integrity while
still recognizing claims alleging implicit bias discrimination.298
Kimble v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development is one
example of how Title VII jurisprudence can evolve within the current
framework.299 Kimble successfully incorporated the social science of
implicit bias into the disparate treatment framework without creating any
new burden-shifting test.300
Instead of requiring employees to present a prima facie case of overt
discrimination before shifting the burden to defendants, employees can be
required to present evidence of implicit bias in action. This can be achieved
by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a plausible inference that an implicit
bias affected an employer’s decision. Evidence supporting this inference
may include the employee’s treatment at the job and an employment
decision inconsistent with the treatment of similarly situated employees.
However, merely pointing to an unfavorable employment outcome and a
few ambiguous situations that may evidence implicit bias would be
insufficient. Thus, employees should be required to demonstrate that they
were adversely affected by an overly subjective decisionmaking process
that naturally allowed for unconscious employment discrimination.301 A
lack of meaningful oversight and the absence of sufficient guidelines or
objective factors to balance out the subjective nature of the decisions would
provide additional evidence.302
Though employers may not be aware of unconscious discrimination, they
would still have the opportunity to rebut presumptions of discrimination by
showing that a legitimate business practice or decision was the true reason
behind any alleged discriminatory behavior. Employers can point to the

the Civil Rights Act has not been touched since the 1991 amendments, and inaction is not
necessarily a choice.
297. See supra Part I.A.2.
298. Since the enactment of Title VII, and subsequent interpretations of the statute and its
amendments, the Supreme Court has created slight variations on the traditional burdenshifting scheme for employment discrimination claims. See supra Part I.A.2–3.
299. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
301. See supra Part II.A (discussing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes; Pippen v. Iowa; and
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.).
302. See supra Part II.A (discussing Dukes, Pippen, Thomas, and the factors the
respective courts considered in evaluating the discrimination claims).
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lack of gut-feeling decisions by demonstrating a conscientious
consideration of all candidates’ merit-based credentials.303
When the burden shifts back to the employee to respond to the
employer’s explanation, the employee can use the full gamut of Title VII
responses—statistical evidence,304 differential treatment of similarly
situated individuals,305 and other similar evidentiary proof—to show that
the employer’s explanation is either not necessarily true or heretofore
unknown to the employer’s decisionmaking personnel. Going further,
however, by directly using the IAT to test employers for implicit biases at
this point is premature, and given all the controversy surrounding the
IAT,306 may never provide adequate proof that implicit biases exist.
Similarly, interpretations of the IAT’s data should be allowed, but only as
highly persuasive evidence of implicit bias.307
The current requirement that employees must identify a specific business
practice should be removed temporarily, until better indicators of implicit
bias are discovered. In cases of implicit bias, this requirement often places
far too high a burden on employees, and also runs counter to recent findings
regarding implicit biases308 and intent.309 Often, unconscious biases
manifest themselves uncontrollably in small, but significant ways
throughout all aspects of the hiring and promotion process.310 As such, a
specific, liability-inducing employment practice will not exist.311 Requiring
303. This is essentially the framework used in the recent cases where implicit bias is a
potential factor, but for the courts’ refusal to acknowledge implicit bias’s existence. See, e.g.,
supra Part II.A.
304. Statistics on their own may be insufficient, but they can greatly support a claim of
implicit bias when combined with other facts indicating that something other than a
legitimate business decision is at play. Compare ROSSEIN, supra note 32, §§ 15:1–17
(analyzing the costs and benefits of using statistics to prove a Title VII employment
discrimination claim), and supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of
statistical proof), with supra Part I.C (discussing the use of statistics to prove a Title VII
employment discrimination claim based on a theory of disparate impact).
305. This will be especially relevant in cases such as Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183
F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1999), and Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir.
1987), rev’d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), when the plaintiff is the member of a
protected group of employees that is underrepresented in a specific workplace. See supra
notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part I.C.
307. The many criticisms about the scientific accuracy of IAT metadata studies still hold
great weight, and it would be inappropriate to treat these studies as more probative evidence
than they actually are. See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text.
308. Compare, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011)
(refusing to consider that the entire Wal-Mart hiring and promotion process could be tainted
by implicit biases), and Pippen v. Iowa, No. LACL107038, slip op. at 52–54 (Iowa Dist. Ct.
Apr. 17, 2012), appeal filed, No. 12-0913 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2012) (refusing to
consider that implicit biases could pervade the executive department’s entire hiring and
promotion system), with supra Part I.B (discussing the pervasiveness of implicit bias and the
ambiguity surrounding subjective employment decisions).
309. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part I.B.2–3.
311. This was the problem in Pippen, where the hiring and promotion process could be
separated into three different steps, and no specific step was the obvious focal point of any
potential discrimination. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Dukes,
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plaintiffs to point to specific practices would, therefore, be almost entirely
inconsistent with social science’s unconscious discrimination findings.
To assuage any concerns the courts may have in recognizing the
existence of an implicit bias, and to protect the employers’ business
interests while preventing frivolous lawsuits, the courts should provide a
less severe remedy than that which is available under the more traditional
Title VII claims. The courts have sufficient experience in dealing with
unintentional discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act312
—finding an analogous remedy, even if only a temporary one, for implicit
bias claims should not be too taxing or difficult.
A higher potential for liability will provide employers with some
incentive to ensure that those responsible for making hiring and promotion
decisions are consciously aware of, and capable of guarding against, the
invasion of any implicit biases in the decisionmaking process. They may
even develop new ways to counter the implicit bias studies in court, leading
in turn to further innovation by those seeking to prove implicit biases exist.
Alternatively, employers have plausible, cost-effective options available to
protect themselves from a broader interpretation of Title VII.313
Effectively, judicial recognition could reduce unconscious discrimination
in the same way that the current version of Title VII has reduced overt,
invidious discrimination. Mere acceptance of the preliminary implicit bias
studies could be the step needed to eliminate this new form of
discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Although Title VII has greatly reduced instances of overt employment
discrimination, implicit bias is still very much a pervasive reality. The
ambiguities and uncertainties associated with implicit bias further
complicate the ability to provide a remedy to employees who have been
adversely affected by their employers’ implicit bias–related decisions.
Currently, because the courts are hesitant to fully embrace the implicit bias
studies, Title VII’s main goal of ending all forms of employment
discrimination is not being faithfully served. Until the courts broadly
recognize the existence of implicit bias, this problem will remain a serious
reality to many female and minority employees who are denied
advancement opportunities.

pinpointing a specific employment practice was nearly impossible, even if one existed,
because too many different Wal-Mart branches were included. See supra note 158 and
accompanying text. Rather, the potential for implicit biases that the human resources
personnel possessed would have been manifested throughout the entire process because of
the uncontrollable nature of these unconscious biases.
312. See supra note 296.
313. Particular employer protections against increased Title VII liabilities are outside the
scope of this Note. However, for one possible example of a solution, see generally David
Hausman, How Congress Could Reduce Job Discrimination by Promoting Anonymous
Hiring, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2012).
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Although the courts may currently lack the ability to accurately recognize
implicit biases, and legislatures may be unwilling to create a new type of
liability for discrimination without intent, the courts’ continued willingness
to experiment with implicit bias within the Title VII framework will place
them in a better position to provide adversely affected employees with a
remedy. Hopefully, increased judicial recognition of the impact of implicit
biases will lead to a truly merit-based workplace, in which female and
minority employees have equal opportunities of advancement, free from
decisionmaking personnel’s unconscious attitudes.

